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Abstract- Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) have emerged as a 
promising technology for providing low-cost community wireless 
services. Despite recent advancement in securing wireless net- 
works, the problem of secure group communication on wireless 
networks has received relatively little attention. Characteristics 
specific to WMNs, such as limited communication range and 
high link error rate, raise unique challenges in designing such 
protocols. 
In this paper we focus on providing data confidentiality for 
group communications on WMNs. First, we propose W-LKH, a 
protocol that combines centralized key management and reliable 
key delivery, to address the less robust communication present 
in wireless networks. Next, we introduce WSOM, a new protocol 
framework designed specifically for the WMNs to overcome 
the performance and security limitations of W-LKH. Simulation 
results show that all of the proposed protocols can provide good 
performance to the upper layer applications, while the WSOM 
protocols incur smaller overhead and are more responsive than 
W-LKH. Finally, we suggest the applicability of each of the 
proposed protocols under different application requirements. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) consist of a set of fixed 
wireless routers that form a multi-hop wireless backbone and 
a set of wireless clients. In recent years, WMNs have become 
a promising key technology for providing low-cost high- 
bandwidth community wireless services. Given the community 
oriented nature of the WMNs, group applications such as real 
time conferencing, multimedia content broadcasting, and file 
sharing are an important class of applications in the WMN 
environment. As with other types of wireless applications, the 
openness of the wireless environment makes security a critical 
concern in deploying such group applications. 
The problem of securing group communication in traditional 
network environments has received significant attention, such 
as the IP multicast [I], [2], [3] and overlay multicast networks 
[4], [S], [6]. However, the constraints and peculiarities of the 
wireless medium are not considered by the protocols designed 
for wired networks, preventing them from being directly 
applied in the wireless environment. For example, the limited 
range of the wireless signal mandates multi-hop delivery of 
both unicast and multicast data, and hence precludes the 
possibility of direct communication between nodes that some 
of the protocols for wired networks rely on. The limited com- 
munication range also necessitates the participation of non- 
group members in the data forwarding protocol which is absent 
in the wired networks. Furthermore, unreliable wireless links 
make loss recovery an essential component of the protocol, 
while scarce network bandwidth resource demands keeping 
the overhead low to be a top priority in the protocol design. 
The secure group communication problem and the related 
key management problem have also been studied for wireless 
sensor networks (WSNs) [7], [8], [91 and mobile ad hoc 
networks (MANETs) [lo], [I 11, [12]. However, services for 
WSNs or MANETs were designed to sustain severe computa- 
tion power, storage, mobility and energy constraints, and as a 
result, they have limited scalability and robustness. As WMNs 
have less restrictive constraints, they create opportunities for 
designing more scalable and robust protocols. 
In this paper, we focus on the problem of ensuring data 
confidentiality for group communications on WMNs. We con- 
sider single-source group applications where a single source 
disseminates data to a dynamically changing set of receivers. 
The main contributions of this paper are: 
We study the design space for secure group communica- 
tion protocols on WMNs. We propose W-LKH, a central- 
ized membership protocol that combines the well-known 
protocol LKH [ l ]  with reliable key delivery mechanisms, 
and a new protocol framework WSOM with decentralized 
membership management that overcomes the limitations 
inherent in W-LKH. 
. We compare all the proposed protocols analytically by 
examining the overhead and their responsiveness to the 
upper layer applications. 
We validate our design experimentally with extensive 
simulations based on the ns simulator [13]. Simulation 
results show that all of the proposed protocols can provide 
good performance to the upper layer applications, and 
with proper optimization, the WSOM based protocols 
incur less overhead and are more responsive than W- 
LKH. We also demonstrate that reliable key delivery is 
critical on WMNs. 
We discuss the applicability of each of the proposed 
protocols under different application requirements. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first 
present related work in Section 11. We then describe the 
network and security model we consider in this work in 
Section 111. We discuss the design goals and main challenges 
in Section IV. Sections V and VI describe the W-LKH and the 
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comparison results for the proposed protocols in Section VII 
and VIII, respectively. We conclude our paper in Section IX. 
In this section, we review the existing work on the secure 
group communication problem for both wired networks and 
wireless networks. 
The problem of secure group communication has received 
significant attention for wired networks. In the context of the 
IP multicast environment, the main focus was primarily to 
reduce the computation overhead of key updates at the source. 
The most well-known protocols are LKH [ l ]  and its variants 
[14], [IS], [16], 1171, [18]. The problem of key transportation 
was studied both in the context of IP multicast [IS], [18] 
and more recently in overlay networks [4], [19], [20], [21], 
[6]. In the latter case, overlays were used as a more realistic 
structure to deliver keys due to lack of deployment of IP 
multicast. However, none of these protocols considered the 
wireless specific constraints and challenges, such as limited 
bandwidth, multi-hop communication through possible non- 
member nodes and higher link error rates. Thus these protocols 
are not directly applicable to WMNs. 
In the wireless environment, work related to secure group 
communication focused on securing the multicast protocols 
and key management. The problem of securing the multicast 
protocol [22] is complementary to providing data confidential- 
ity, as it focuses only on the control message and not the data 
traffic. Several researchers [7], [8], [9] proposed schemes for 
establishing pair-wise symmetric keys for sensor networks and 
wireless ad hoc networks. These schemes focus on secure pair- 
wise communications instead of group communications. Zhu 
et a1 [lo] proposed GKMPAN, a secure group communication 
that uses symmetric keys to distribute the common group key 
for data encryption among group members. The main focus of 
GKMPAN is on handling member revocations, instead of the 
potentially much more frequent member join and leave events. 
Moreover, GKMPAN requires key pre-distribution, which is 
not always available, and a broadcast authentication scheme, 
such as TESLA [23], which has the additional requirement of 
time synchronization. Balachandran et a1 proposed CRTDH 
[ l l ]  for secure group communication which relies on the 
Chinese Remainder Theorem and the Diffie-Hellman group 
key agreement for establishing group keys. The shortcoming 
of the CRTDH is that every group join and leave event requires 
the number of messages being delivered be proportional to the 
group size, hence it is not scalable in a wireless environment 
where the bandwidth resource is scarce. Kaya et a1 [12] present 
a secure multicast scheme for mobile ad hoc networks. Instead, 
our protocols focus on the WMNs which allow for further 
optimizations by exploiting the static network topology. 
111. NETWORK A N D  SECURITY MODEL 
A. Network Model 
Our target network environment is WMNs, where nodes 
are assumed to be static and communicate through multi-hop 
wireless links. Possible link and node failures are allowed in 
the network. We focus on the group communication scenario 
where one data source broadcasts data to a set of receivers 
(group members) that can dynamically change throughout 
the broadcast session. We assume a tree-based on-demand 
multicast protocol is used to deliver the group data. For con- 
creteness, we consider the well-known MAODV [24] protocol 
in presenting our protocols. 
Due to the multi-hop communication of WMNs, it is neces- 
sary that non-group members participate in the multicast tree 
construction. Hence, the multicast tree contains two types of 
nodes: member nodes and nonmember nodes. Member nodes 
are nodes on the tree that are also members of the multicast 
group. The non-member nodes are not part of the multicast 
group but rather act as routers that help to connect the member 
nodes. We refer to the nodes in the multicast tree (both member 
and non-member) as tree nodes. Nodes that are not part of the 
multicast tree are called non-tree nodes. 
B. Security and Adversarial Model 
Our focus is on providing confidentiality of the data from 
outside adversaries, where an outsider is any non-member 
node, including non-member nodes that are on the multicast 
tree. Nodes that have left the group are also considered 
outsiders. We assume that the current group members do not 
leak data or keys to non-authorized nodes. 
We assume there is a group manager that manages that 
group membership. The group manager acts as a certificate 
authority (CA) for the group, responsible for issuing member 
certificates that bind a member's public key to the group IP 
address and for revoking group memberships. We also assume 
all group members know the public key of the group manager, 
so that all member certificates can be verified by any group 
member. 
We do not consider attacks against the multicast protocol 
itself. For example, we do not consider denial of service 
(DoS) attacks against data forwarding and assume both group 
members and non-member nodes forward application and 
control data according to the protocol specification. Protecting 
the multicast protocol is complementary to our work. 
IV. DESIGN SPACE 
The security goal of our protocol is to ensure data confiden- 
tiality. However, this goal should not be achieved at the price 
of sacrificing performance and robustness. More specifically, 
properties we want to achieve are: 
Group secrecy: this property makes it computationally 
infeasible for a non-member node to discover the group data; 
this also includes properties like forward or backward secrecy 
which guarantee that it is computationally infeasible for a 
member node to get access to group data before joining the 
group, or after leaving (or being revoked from) the group, 
respectively. 
Efficiency: the wireless environment requires that the pro- 
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Robustness: the protocol should be resilient to unreliable 
links and possible link and node failures. 
Performance: the secure protocol should maintain similar 
data throughput to the upper layer application as the unsecured 
protocol. 
Efficient confidentiality and integrity of data delivery for 
group communication can be achieved by using symmetric- 
key based cryptographic algorithms. We consider two main 
approaches: one relies on using a common key to encrypt and 
decrypt the data, while the other uses per-hop keys to achieve 
the same goals. 
Common-key based approach. In this approach, the critical 
component is the protocol that defines how the common data 
encrypting key (also referred as group key) is computed and 
disseminated. Such protocols are also referred to as group key 
management protocols. Although the group key management 
protocols are already extensively studied for the wired net- 
works, the unique characteristics of wireless communication 
introduces new challenges that require new solutions tailored 
for the wireless environment. For example, many previously 
proposed protocols were designed under the assumption that 
there exist mechanisms for reliable key delivery. However, 
in the wireless environment, links are inherently much less 
reliable. In addition, the multi-hop nature of wireless com- 
munication exacerbates the problem of unreliable links, since 
missing one key packet at one node affects all downstream 
nodes that rely on this node. Therefore,' achieving efficient 
reliable key delivery is a critical component for group key 
management protocols in wireless networks. Compared to 
the wired networks, the key delivery structure is also less 
straightforward in the wireless environment. On one hand, the 
existing group data delivery structure may not be optimized 
for delivering keys, since keys have much more stringent 
reliability requirement than data. On the other hand, building 
a customized delivery structure for keys requires additional 
protocols for handling of possible link and node failures. 
Careful selection of the key delivery structure is necessary 
for wireless networks. 
Per-hop key based approach. In the per-hop key based ap- 
proach, the group data is encrypted hop-by-hop by relying on 
the secure channels established between group members. One 
of the main challenges for such protocols in the wireless envi- 
ronment is that group members do not directly communicate 
with each other. Therefore, non-member nodes are required 
in the establishment of the secure channels, which introduces 
additional security concerns. Secondly, the straightforward 
way of using hop-by-hop encryption disallows the use of 
broadcast for data dissemination, instead hop-by-hop unicast 
must be used. Additional mechanisms are required for the per- 
hop key approach to take advantage of the broadcast nature 
of wireless communication for data dissemination. 
Given the above described design space and challenges, in 
the rest of the paper, we first present a protocol that adopts the 
common key based approach and several other protocols that 
adopt the per-hop key based approach. We will discuss in detail 
how these protocols address the challenges in the wireless 
networks, and describe their advantages and limitations. 
In this section, we present W-LKH, a secure group commu- 
nication for WMNs that uses the common key based approach. 
We first provide an overview of W-LKH, then describe its 
reliable key delivery mechanisms, and finally discuss its lim- 
itations. 
A. Overview of W-LKH 
W-LKH is based on a well-known centralized scheme, LKH. 
We selected LKH because it was intensively studied and it was 
shown to work well in wired networks. We chose its batching 
variant [14], which we refer to as B-LKH, given the benefits 
of batching in reducing the computation and communication 
overhead. 
In W-LKH, data is encrypted using a group key and 
delivered on the multicast tree. In order to ensure forward 
and backward secrecy of the group data, at every join and 
leave event, the source is notified and a new key is generated 
and distributed to the current group members. As in B-LKH, 
the source maintains a logical key tree to ensure a logarithmic 
bound for the size of the message rekey. The main difference 
between W-LKH and B-LKH is the message delivery process. 
Delivery of join and leave messages: In order to maintain 
the consistency of the logical key tree maintained at the source, 
the join and leave requests have to be delivered via reliable 
channels. The TCP protocol, which is normally used in wired 
networks, does not work well for the delivery of the join 
and leave requests on WMNs, as building a TCP session 
requires several round trip time and the delivery of several 
control packets, and consequently results in large latency 
and bandwidth overhead. Instead, we use a simple reliable 
transport protocol which involves only an ACK from the 
receiver to ensure reliable delivery. Therefore, for most cases, 
only one round trip time and one additional control message 
are required to complete a join or leave request. 
B. Rekey Message Transportation 
The responsibility of the rekey message transportation pro- 
cess is to deliver the rekey messages generated by the data 
source reliably to each group member. The approach we use 
for the rekey message transportation is to enhance the existing 
MAODV tree built for the data delivery with hop-by-hop 
reliability for delivering the rekey messages, such that each 
node retransmits the rekey message until all of its downstream 
members receives the message. 
I) Hop-by-Hop Reliable Key Delivery: The most common 
approach to the hop-by-hop reliable delivery is the ACK 
mechanism, where the receiver sends an ACK to the sender 
after receiving a message, as in the 802.1 1 unicast protocol. 
However, since in the multicast environment, there are usually 
multiple downstream receivers for each rekey message, the 
ACK mechanism can cause the well-known ACK implosion 
problem. Instead, we choose to use the NACK mechanism, 

























packet misses. The missing of rekey messages can be detected 
when a node receives a data packet encrypted with an unknown 
key. Since receiving data packets is a frequent event, the 
detection of missing keys happens quickly. Compared to the 
ACK mechanism, the NACK mechanism also has the benefit 
of smaller overhead, as it is expected that the probability of a 
node receiving a rekey message is greater than the probability 
of missing the message. 
To further reduce the protocol overhead, we exploit the 
broadcast nature of wireless signal by applying the NACK 
suppression technique [25]. With the NACK suppression tech- 
nique, when a node detects that it misses a rekey message, 
instead of firing the NACK immediately, it sets a NACK 
timer with a random timeout up to some maximum value. 
If it receives a NACK from another node requesting the same 
rekey message before its NACK timer expires, it resets its 
NACK timeout value. The NACK timer is cancelled once 
the node receives the missing rekey message it requested. 
Since most downstream nodes are close to each other, for 
most cases only one NACK message is necessary even though 
multiple downstream nodes miss the same rekey message. 
Furthermore, if the NACK timer is set small enough, the 
missing rekey message can be recovered before the next data 
packet is broadcasted by the parent. This allows for time 
sensitive applications to resume the decryption of data as soon 
as possible while keeping the overhead low. 
2) Rekey Message Recovery: Even with hop-by-hop relia- 
bility, a number of rekey messages can still be lost for a large 
duration of time for a particular node due to link or node 
failures and network partitions. In such cases, the key recovery 
procedure is invoked to recover the missing keys. Instead of 
requesting the missing packets directly from the data source, as 
in the wired network, we adopt a local recovery procedure in 
order to minimize the bandwidth overhead while not affecting 
the application performance. 
The local recovery procedure is only invoked at a node 
when the node can receive a continuous stream of data packets 
from its upstream node, as the continuous stream of data 
packets indicates the path between the node and the data 
source is functional. To initiate the local recovery process, the 
node transmits a NACK packet containing all the sequence 
numbers of the missing rekey messages to its tree parent. 
Once the tree parent receives the NACK packet, it sends to 
the requesting node the requested rekey messages for which 
it has already received. For the other rekey messages, a local 
recovery procedure is recursively invoked on the tree parent. 
The process repeats until all the requested rekey messages are 
delivered to the original requesting node. 
Note that in the above described local recovery process, 
it is necessary for each node to buffer the rekey messages 
that it receives for some period of time so that the request 
for missing rekey messages from downstream nodes can be 
satisfied as locally as possible. Since rekey messages are of 
small size and are issued infrequently with the batch rekeying 
technique, it is feasible for each nodes to buffer recent rekey 
messages for the purpose of rekey message recovery. 
3)  Data and Key Message Ordering: Since in the above 
rekey transportation and recovery scheme the missing of 
rekey messages is detected by receiving data packets that 
are encrypted with unknown keys, we require that each node 
forwards only data packets for which it has the decryption key 
and buffers undecryptable data packets until the corresponding 
decryption key has been received and forwarded to the down- 
stream node. This requirement minimizes the out-of-order 
problem of key and data message, thus reducing the number 
of NACKs for missing key messages. Under most cases, it 
also ensures that when a node receives a NACK for a rekey 
message, it has already received the requested rekey message, 
thus recursive propagation of NACK message is eliminated. 
Note that delaying forwarding undecryptable packets does not 
affect the data throughput for the application, as a packet 
undecryptable in a node is necessarily undecryptable in its 
downstream nodes. 
C. Limitations of W-LKH 
Although W-LKH has been optimized for the WMNs, it 
still has several limitations. First, the join and leave requests 
require message exchanges between the joining or leaving 
node to the data source. Depending on the distance from the 
joining or leaving node to the data source, this operation can 
incur significant latency and bandwidth overhead. Second, the 
rekey message which includes key encryptions required by 
all the group members needs to be transmitted throughout 
the multicast tree, even though typically only a subset of 
the encryptions are required by a particular branch of the 
tree. Finally, the use of batching for reducing the bandwidth 
overhead also causes partial loss of the forward and backward 
data secrecy. These limitations are the consequence of the fun- 
damental design choice made by the LKH scheme, centralized 
group membership management, where the data source is the 
central point that handles all group join and leave events. 
VI. SECURE OVERLAY BASED SECURE MULTICAST IN 
WMNs 
In this section, we present a new secure multicast protocol 
framework, WSOM, that uses the decentralized membership 
management principle to address the limitations in W-LKH. 
We first provide an overview of the framework, then present 
three different protocols and a member revocation mechanism. 
A. Overview of WSOM 
The WSOM framework is based on an overlay tree main- 
tained on top of the data delivery multicast tree. The overlay 
consists of only member nodes and two member nodes are 
connected on the overlay if they are adjacent in the underlying 
multicast tree disregarding non-member nodes. Figure 1 shows 
an example of the overlay structure for a sample multicast sce- 
nario. Neighboring nodes on the overlay maintain a symmetric 
key, referred to as link key, between them, which establishes 
a secure channel between these two nodes. We refer to this 
overlay network as a secure overlay. Since we only consider 
tree based multicast structure, the overlay structure we just 
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described is necessarily a tree. For convenience, we use the 
term overlay parent, overlay children and overlay neighbor to 
refer to the parent, children, and neighbor of a node in the 
overlay, respectively. 
Fig. 1. Example secure overlay 
Maintenance of the Secure Overlay: The key for maintain- 
ing the secure overlay is for each node to maintain an updated 
link key with its overlay neighbors as the underlying multicast 
tree changes, which can be caused by group join, group leave, 
and link and node failures. We now present the operations 
required for handling each such event in detail. 
For group joins, after being part of the multicast tree, the 
joining node communicates with its overlay parent along the 
multicast tree path to establish a link key using the standard 
public key infrastructure (PKI) techniques. If the joining node 
is already a tree node before joining, it also needs to build a 
link key with each of its overlay children. To accomplish this, 
the joining node broadcasts a parent change packet including 
its member certificate downward along the tree. Each of its 
overlay children, upon receiving the parent change packet, 
generates a random link key and sends it to the joining node 
after proper signing and encrypting using the standard PKI 
techniques. For graceful group leaves, the overlay parent of 
the leaving node is notified of the event and establishes link 
keys with the overlay children of the leaving node in a way 
that is similar to when the joining node builds link keys with 
its overlay children. For ungraceful leaves and link and node 
failures, the link keys are re-established once the downstream 
nodes get reconnected back to the tree much like the joining 
case. 
Note that in handling all of the above events, only local 
message exchanges are required. Moreover, in the WMN 
environment, where all nodes are static, most changes on 
the underlying multicast tree are due to group join and leave 
events. Therefore, for stable groups and network environment, 
the overhead for maintaining the secure overlay is very small. 
B. WSOM Protocols 
In  this section, we present three different secure multicast 
protocols that use the secure overlay structure as described in 
the previous section: WSOM-GK, WSOM-LK, and WSOM- 
HK. 
I )  WSOM-GK: WSOM with Group Key for Data Encryp- 
tion: In this protocol, a group key is maintained among all 
group members. The group data is encrypted with the group 
key at the source, then disseminated on the multicast tree. 
The source periodically refreshes the group key by generating 
a new group key. The new group key is disseminated to all 
group members using the secure overlay. 
For group joins, besides updating the secure overlay, the 
overlay parent of the joining node piggy-backs the current 
group key on the messages required for updating the secure 
overlay, so that the joining node can start decrypting group 
data immediately. For group leaves, only the update of the 
secure overlay is required. Key loss due to node or link failures 
can be handled in a way similar to the local key recovery 
strategy in W-LKH. 
The main limitation of this protocol is that it suffers 
from partial loss of the forward and backward data secrecy. 
However, the application can adjust the key refreshment period 
to balance the bandwidth overhead and the loss of the forward 
and backward secrecy. 
2) WSOM-LK: WSOM with Link Key for Data Encryption: 
In this protocol, the group data is delivered directly on the 
secure overlay. To forward a data packet, the node encrypts 
the data packet with the link key of each of its overlay children 
and then forwards the encrypted packet to the corresponding 
children. This basic scheme suffers from two drawbacks. First, 
re-encrypting the data packet for each of the overlay children 
requires computation cost linear to the number of overlay 
children for each node, which can be significant for nodes with 
many children. Second, it is impossible to exploit the broadcast 
nature of wireless transmission, as each of the encrypted data 
packet is only useful for one downstream child. To overcome 
these drawbacks, instead of using link keys to encrypt the data 
packets directly, the source encrypts the data packet with a 
randomly generated data encryption key (kd) .  To disseminate 
the data packet, the source encrypts kd with the link key of 
each of its overlay children, piggy-backs all the encryptions 
of kd to the data packet, and then broadcasts the packet on 
the multicast tree. When a member node receives an encrypted 
packet, it can decrypt the packet by first decrypting kd with its 
corresponding link key and then using kd to decrypt the data 
packet. For forwarding the received packet to its downstream 
nodes, the member node re-encrypts kd with the link keys 
of its overlay children, and replaces the kd encryptions on 
the received packet with the new set of encryptions of kd. 
Although the number of encryptions required for each node is 
also linear to the number of overlay children of the node, this 
scheme is still computation-wise efficient, as the size of kd is 
typically only 128 bits. 
Since no additional control data is maintained in WSOM- 
LK, the handling of join and leave events only requires 
updating the secure overlay. Unlike WSOM-GK, this protocol 
does not suffer from key loss problem. 
3) WSOM-HK: WSOM with Hop Key for Data Encryption: 
In WSOM-LK, even with the optimization of using data 
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group key on the essages required for updating the secure
overlay, so t at the j i node can start decrypting group
data i ediately. For group leaves, only the update of the
secure overlay is required. ey loss due to node or link failures
can be handled in a ay si ilar to the local key recovery
strategy in -L H.
The ain li itation of this protocol is that it suf ers
from partial los of the for ard and back ard data secrecy.
o ever, the application can adjust the key refres e t period
to balance the band idth overhead and the los of the forward
and back ard secrecy.
2) SOM-LK: SOM with Link ey f ata Encryption:
In this protocol, the group data is delivered directly on the
secure overlay. To forward a data packet, the node encrypts
the data packet with the link key of each of its overlay children
and then forwards the encrypted packet to the corresponding
children. This basic sche e suf ers fro two drawbacks. First,
re-encrypting the data packet for each of the overlay children
requires co putation cost linear to the nu ber of overlay
children for each node, which can be significant for nodes with
many children. Second, it is impos ible to exploit the broadcast
nature of wireles transmis ion, as each of the encrypted data
packet is only useful for one downstream child. To overco e
these drawbacks, instead of using link keys to encrypt the data
packets directly, the source encrypts the data packet with a
rando ly generated data encryption key (kd)' To dis eminate
the data packet, the source encrypts kd with the link key of
each of its overlay children, piggy-backs al the encryptions
of kd to the data packet, and then broadcasts the packet on
the multicast tre . hen a member node receives an encrypted
packet, it can decrypt the packet by first decrypting kd with its
cor esponding link key and then using kd to decrypt the data
packet. For forwarding the received packet to its downstream
nodes, the member node re-encrypts kd with the link keys
of its overlay children, and replaces the kd encryptions on
the received packet with the new set of encryptions of kd.
Although the number of encryptions required for each node is
also linear to the number of overlay children of the node, this
scheme is stil computation-wise ef icient, as the size of kd is
typical y only 128 bits.
Since no additional control data is maintained in WSOM-
LK, the handling of join and leave events only requires
updating the secure overlay. Unlike WSOM-GK, this protocol
does not suf er from key los problem.
3) WSOM-HK: WSOM with Hop Key for Data Encryption:
In WSOM-LK, even with the optimization of using data
encryption keys, there is still per data packet computation and
bandwidth overhead on each member node for encrypting and 
delivering the key for each of its overlay children. The aim of 
WSOM-HK is to reduce both the computation and bandwidth 
overhead by maintaining a hop key among every member node 
and its overlay children. With the help of the hop key, the data 
encryption key only needs to be encrypted once with the hop 
key and only one encryption of the key needs to be appended 
to the data packet for forwarding to the downstream nodes, 
instead of one for each overlay child as in the WSOM-LK 
protocol. 
Each hop key can be regarded as a mini group key with 
the member node as the source and its overlay children as 
the group members. Due to the small scale, a straightforward 
approach, such as encrypting and delivering the new hop key 
to each of the overlay children whenever the overlay children 
set changes, can be employed to maintain the hop key. 
The cost of maintaining a hop key is amortized over all 
the data packets delivered using that key. Unlike WSOM-LK 
scheme, this scheme has lower per packet overhead. 
C. Revocation in the WSOM Based Protocols 
Unlike in the centralized membership management schemes 
where member revocations can be easily performed by the cen- 
tral point, in decentralized membership management schemes, 
a separate membership revocation mechanism has to be pro- 
vided. Instead of using the straightforward certificate re- 
vocation list (CRL) approach, which requires the reliable 
delivery of the CRLs to all group members, we design a 
new more efficient revocation mechanisms for the WSOM 
based protocols. The main observation we exploit is that 
under the static topology of WMNs, it is possible to restrict 
a node to join the secure overlay only through a few nearby 
member nodes, which we will refer to as the join points of 
the node. Then to revoke a member node, it is sufficient to 
delivery the revocation notice to only the small number of 
join points of the node, instead of to the whole group, thus 
saving the network bandwidth. In the following, we describe 
the details of the revocation protocol together with the required 
changes on the WSOM protocol. For convenience, we refer 
to our revocation protocol as WSOM-revoke and the entity 
responsible for issuing and revoking the member certificates 
as the group manager. 
1) Overview of WSOM-revoke: With WSOM-revoke, prior 
to obtaining the member certificate, the node attempting to 
join the group selects a set of its nearby member nodes as 
its join points. Then during the process obtaining the member 
certificate, the node provides the pre-selected join points to 
the group manager, which then saves the join points and also 
includes them in the member certificate for the node. To join 
the secure overlay, the node only activates the multicast tree 
branch that leads to one of its pre-selected join points, which 
we will refer to its actual join point. The actual join point 
verifies that itself is in the set of pre-selected join points of 
the joining node by checking the node's member certificate and 
that the joining node is not revoked before admitting the node 
as its overlay child. Now, to revoke a member node, the group 
manager only needs to delivery the revocation notice to the 
pre-selected join points of the node1. Once all the join points 
of the node receive the revocation notice, the node can no 
longer join the secure overlay, thus loses its ability to decrypt 
the group data. 
2)  Details of WSOM-revoke: Now we discuss some more 
subtle details of the WSOM-revoke protocol. 
Pre-selecting the join points To obtain a suitable set of 
join points, the joining node broadcasts in the local scope 
a member request message. The member nodes that receive 
the member request message reply a member reply message 
including its identity and its distance to the data source. The 
joining node then selects the best join points among all the 
member nodes who replied by considering the distance of the 
replying member node to itself and to the data source. 
The size of the join point set In order to prevent arbitrary 
large join point set, which can potentially be used to mount 
DoS attack during the revocation process and to delay the 
revocation of the node, the group manager can impose an 
upper bound on the number of join points each node can use. 
Due to the static nature of the network topology, an upper 
bound as few as three can be sufficient. 
Handling group leaves Since group leave is a common event, 
it is possible for a node that its actual join point decides to 
leave the group, or all the pre-selected join points of the node 
leave the group. In both cases, it is desirable that the ability 
of the node to join the secure overlay is not affected. To 
achieve this, we introduce a join point delegation mechanism. 
With the delegation mechanism, when a node decides to leave 
the group, it delegates the join point responsibility for its 
overlay children to its overlay parent by sending a signed 
delegation message to its overlay parent. Similarly, when a 
node that has left the group receives join request, it delegates 
the join point responsibility to its overlay parent with a signed 
delegation message. Therefore, in both cases, the joining node 
can continue to join the secure overlay via the join point that 
has left; its ability to join the secure overlay is oblivious of 
the leave status of its selected join points. 
Updating join points It is possible that all of the pre-selected 
join points of a member node are revoked or fail. In such 
cases, it is necessary for the member node to obtain new join 
points in order to continue to participate in the secure overlay. 
A member node may also desire to change its join point set if 
it finds a better set of join points. In both cases, a join point 
update procedure is called for. With WSOM-revoke, updating 
join points is achieved by obtaining a new member certificate 
with the new join point set from the group manager. Since 
it is expected that the member revocation and failure events 
are infrequent and the static network environment limits the 
opportunity of finding better join points, we expect the join 
' ~ e l i v e r i n ~  the revocation notice to the join points of the node is sufficient 
for denying the access to the group data for the node. The revocation notice 
may also need to be delivered to the member nodes which have the revoked 
node as one of its join points, so that those nodes will not select the revoked 
node as their overlay parent. However, under the assumption of no DoS attack, 
the revoked node cannot pretend to be member node to prevent member nodes' 
access to data. 
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point update procedure is only invoked infrequently, hence the 
centralized design for handling the procedure is acceptable. 
VII. ANALYTICAL COMPARISON 
In this section, we analyze and compare the overhead of 
the proposed protocols. We focus on the communication cost 
since bandwidth is the main limitation. 
In order to have a clear comparison between the protocols, 
we make the following assumptions. We assume there is no 
interference, thus the bandwidth cost for sending a message 
depends only on the path length (in hop count) and the size 
of the message. We use b to denote the bandwidth cost of 
transmitting one byte to the group via the multicast. Thus, the 
bandwidth cost of multicasting a packet of size D to the group 
is bD. We assume that the latency of a message depends only 
on the number of hops travelled by the message and both join 
and leave require only one round trip of message exchange. 
Table I shows all the parameters we use in the comparison. 
Table I1 shows the results of different metrics for different 
operations in the proposed protocols. Based on these compar- 
ison results, we now highlight a few differences between the 
protocols. 
For join and leave operations, there is potentially a large 
bandwidth and latency cost for W-LKH (depending on the 
distance between the data source and the joining or leaving 
node), whereas, WSOM based schemes only incur constant 
costs. 
W-LKH and WSOM-GK, which use the common group key 
to encrypt group data, require rekey operations, whereas, no 
rekey operations are necessary for WSOM-LK and WSOM- 
HK. The rekey operations consume network bandwidth re- 
source, while batching introduces a vulnerability window. 
WSOM based protocols require explicit revocation mes- 
sages, which is not necessary for W-LKH. In applications with 
only infrequent revocations, the bandwidth cost for revocation 
is insignificant. For applications that require frequent revoca- 
tions, we can batch process the revocations in the same way 
as batching the rekey operations for the group key and use the 
life time of membership certificates to reduce the revocation 
bandwidth overhead to an acceptable range. 
For common group key based protocols (W-LKH and 
WSOM-GK), there is no per data packet overhead, whereas, 
WSOM-LK and WSOM-HK incur per data packet overhead. 
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS 
In this section, we present the results of our experiments 
with the ns [13] network simulator for evaluating the proposed 
protocols. We first demonstrate the importance of reliable key 
delivery for group key management protocols in WMNs, then 
we evaluate and compare the performance and overhead of the 
proposed protocols. 
A. Simulation Setup 
The MAODV implementation we used is provided by Zhu et 
a1 [26]. 
Nodes are configured to use the IEEE 802.1 1 radios with 
2Mbps physical bandwidth and 250-meter nominal range. In 
each simulation, 100 nodes are randomly placed within a 1500 
meters by 1500 meters area and the multicast data source is 
placed at the center of the area at the coordinates (750, 750). 
The duration of a simulation is 900 seconds. In the begin- 
ning of each simulation, a set of nodes are randomly selected 
to be the initial group members and join the group sequentially 
at the rate of one join per three seconds. For experiments 
with no group dynamics, the initial group size is the fixed 
group size for the experiment. For experiments with group 
dynamics, the initial group size is the stable group size for the 
experiment. After the initial joins are completed, the source 
starts to multicast data packets of size 256 bytes to the group 
at a rate specific to each experiment until the end of the 
simulation. For the experiments that examine the effect of 
group dynamics, the data rate is fixed at 5 packetslsecond. 
Based on previously observed group dynamics for multicast 
applications [27], [28], [29], we use Poisson process to model 
the member join and leave events with different rates to reflect 
different levels of group dynamics. We set the join and leave 
rates to be equal, so the group size remains stable. For each 
join event, a random non-member node is selected to join the 
group; similarly for each leave event, a random member node 
is selected to leave the group. 
For protocols that require periodic rekeying (which includes 
B-LKH, W-LKH and WSOM-GK), the rekey period is set to 
be 30 seconds. The maximum NACK timeout value used for 
the reliable key delivery is set to be 100ms. We also assume 
in all the protocols the size of symmetric keys is 128 bits, the 
size of publiclprivate keys is 1024 bits, and the computation 
delay for PKI signatures is 4 m ~ . ~  
We experimented with different group sizes, however, since 
the comparison results of different protocols are similar for 
different group sizes, we only present the results for the group 
size of 50. In all the figures, each data point is the average 
of 10 different runs with different random topologies and 
different random group join and leave events. 
B. Metrics 
We measure the performance of the secure multicast pro- 
tocols with two metrics, the delivery ratio and the decryption 
ratio. For each member node, the delivery ratio is defined 
as the fraction of data packets that are received by the node 
out of all the data packets that are broadcasted by the data 
source during the time when the node is a group member. 
The decryption ratio for a member node is defined as the 
fraction of data packets that can be decrypted by the member 
out of all the data packets received by the member. Thus, 
the delivery ratio measures the impact of the secure multicast 
protocol on the data delivery ability of the underlying multicast 
We implemented our experiments based on the ns network 
simulator [13] (version 2.26) with CMU Monarch extensions. 
'This value is based on the 1024 bits RSA implementation of openss l  
on 3GHz Intel Pentium IV computer. 
point update procedure is only invoked infrequently, hence the
centralized design for handling the procedure is ac eptable.
VI . ANALYTICAL COMPARISON
In this section, we analyze and compare the overhead of
the proposed protocols. We focus on the communication cost
since bandwidth is the main limitation.
In order to have a clear comparison betwe n the protocols,
we make the following as umptions. We as ume there is no
interference, thus the bandwidth cost for sending a essage
depends only on the path length (in hop count) and the size
of the mes age. We use b to denote the bandwidth cost of
transmit ing one byte to the group via the multicast. Thus, the
bandwidth cost of multicasting a packet of size D to the group
is bD. We as ume that the latency of a mes age depends only
on the number of hops travel ed by the mes age and both joi
and leave require only one round trip of mes age exchange.
Table I shows all the parameters we use in the comparison.
Table I shows the results of dif erent metrics for dif erent
operations in the proposed protocols. Based on these compar-
ison results, we now highlight a few dif erences between the
protocols.
• For join and leave operations, there is potential y a large
bandwidth and latency cost for -LKH (depending on the
distance between the data source and the joining or leaving
node), whereas, SOM based schemes only incur constant
costs.
• W-LKH and WSOM-GK, which use the common group key
to encrypt group data, require rekey operations, whereas, no
rekey operations are neces ary for SO -LK and SO -
HK. The rekey operations consume network band idth re-
source, while batching introduces a vulnerability window.
• WSOM based protocols require explicit revocation mes-
sages, which is not neces ary for -LKH. In applications with
only infrequent revocations, the bandwidth cost for revocation
is insignificant. For applications that require frequent revoca-
tions, we can batch proces the revocations in the same ay
as batching the rekey operations for the group key and use the
life time of membership certificates to reduce the revocation
bandwidth overhead to an acceptable range.
• For common group key based protocols ( -LKH and
SOM-GK), there is no per data packet overhead, hereas,
SOM-LK and SO -H incur per data packet overhead.
VI . EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATIONS
In this section, we present the results of our experiments
with the ns [13] network simulator for evaluating the proposed
protocols. e first demonstrate the importance of reliable key
delivery for group key manage ent protocols in Ns, then
we evaluate and compare the perfor ance and overhead of the
proposed protocols.
A. Simulation Setup
We implemented our experiments based on the ns net ork
simulator [13] (version 2.26) with C U onarch extensions.
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The AODV imple entation e used is provided by hu et
al [26].
Nodes are configured to use the IEEE 802.1 radios ith
2 bps physical band idth and 250- eter no inal range. In
each simulation, 10 nodes are rando ly placed ithin a 1500
meters by 150 eters area and the ulticast data source is
placed at the center of the area at the coordinates (750, 750).
The duration of a si ulation is 900 seconds. In the begin-
ning of each simulation, a set of nodes are rando ly selected
to be the initial group e bers and j i the group sequential y
at the rate of one joi per three seconds. For experi ents
with no group dynamics, the initial group size is the fixed
group size for the experiment. For experi ents ith group
dynamics, the initial group size is the stable group size for the
experiment. After the initial joins are co pleted, the source
starts to ulticast data packets of size 256 bytes to the group
at a rate specific to each experi e t until the end o the
si ulation. For the experi ents that exa ine the effect o
group dynamics, the data rate is fixed at 5 packets/second.
Based on previously observed group dynamics for ulticast
applications [27], [28], [29], e use Poiss process to odel
the e ber joi and leave events ith differe t rates to reflect
dif erent levels of group dyna ics. e set the j i and leave
rates to be equal, so the group size re ains stable. r each
join event, a random non- e er node is selected to j i the
group; si ilarly for each leave event, a rando e ber node
is selected to leave the group.
For protocols that require periodic rekeying ( hich includes
B-LKH, -LKH and S - ), the rekey period is set to
be 30 seconds. The aximum ti e t value used for
the reliable key delivery is set to be lOO s. e also assu e
in al the protocols the size of sy etric keys is 128 its, t e
size of public/private keys is 1024 bits, and the co putati
delay for PKI signatures is 4ms. 2
e experi ented ith different group sizes, ho ever, since
the co parison results of different protocols are si ilar for
different group sizes, e only prese t the res lts for the roup
size of 50. In al the figures, each data i t is t e a erage
of 10 different runs ith differ t ra t l i s and
dif erent rando group j i and leave events.
B. etrics
e easure the perf r a of the secure lti t r -
tocols ith t o etrics, the delivery ratio and t e ecry ti
ratio. For each e ber node, the delivery ratio is efined
as the fraction of data packets that are received by the ode
out of al the data packets that are broad t b the data
source during the ti e hen the node is a roup e ber.
The decryption ratio for a e ber ode is efined as t e
fraction of data packets that can be decrypted the e r
out of al the data packets received by the e ber. us,
the delivery ratio easures the i pact of the secure lti t
protocol on the data delivery ability o the underlying lticast
2 value is based on the 1024 bits RSA i ple entation of enssl
on 3GHz Intel Penti IV computer.
I number of members I n 1  
multicast tree height 
average tree degree 
symmetric key length 
CRL length 
~ join or leave 
distance between the joining or 1 6 
leaving node and the source 
bandwidth cost for group multicast I b 
TABLE I 
PARAMETERS FOR PROTOCOL OVERHEAD uOne additional 
COMPARISONS 
protocol, whereas, the decryption ratio measures the impact 
of the secure multicast protocol on the actual data goodput 
received by the upper layer application. In order to get a 
lower bound on the delivery ratio and the decryption ratio, 
we assume the upper layer application requires time sensitive 
delivery, that is, a member node cannot buffer undecryptable 
packets for decryption and forwarding upon the receiving of 
proper keys, instead such packets are dropped by the member. 
The overhead of the secure multicast protocols are measured 
in terms of the bandwidth overhead of the protocol and the 
latency for group join and leave events. Due to the scarcity 
of bandwidth resources on WMNs, it is essential to compare 
the bandwidth overhead incurred by different protocols. The 
latency of join and leave events reflects the responsiveness of 
the protocol to the upper layer applications. 
C. Reliable Key Transport 
We now demonstrate the importance of reliable key trans- 
port for secure multicast protocols on WMNs, which motivates 
our design for W-LKH. Figure 2(a) and 2(b) show the delivery 
and decryption ratio of LKH and B-LKH for different levels 
of group dynamics. As we can see from these figures, while 
both LKH and B-LKH maintain a similar delivery ratio as 
the case without any security mechanism, these two protocols 
have very poor decryption ratios. The poor decryption ratio for 
LKH is due to two reasons: the high probability of key loss 
on the wireless network and the frequent rekeying operations 
which exacerbate the key loss problem. B-LKH improves 
the decryption ratio over LKH by reducing the frequency of 
the rekey operations, however, since the key loss problem is 
not solved, the end result is still not satisfactory. If we can 
further solve the key loss problem, as we will see in the 
performance results of W-LKH below, the decryption ratio 
turns out to be dramatically improved. Therefore, based on 
these observations, we conclude that reliable key delivery is 
essential for secure multicast protocols on WMNs. 
D. Protocol Performance and Robustness 
Figure 2(c), 2(d) and Figure 2(e), 2(f) show the delivery and 
decryption ratio for all the proposed protocols for different 
levels of data rate and group dynamics, respectively. We ob- 
serve that for all the data rates and group dynamics examined, 
all the proposed secure multicast protocols can maintain a 
TABLE I1 
OVERHEAD COMPARISON RESULTS 
I hop time for the new link key 
similar high delivery ratio as in the case where no security 
mechanisms are being used. The decryption ratios for all the 
protocols are also almost 1. Therefore, we conclude that all 
the proposed protocols can provide good transparency in terms 
of data throughput to the upper layer applications. We also 
experimented with random node and link failures to examine 
the robustness of the protocols in the case of failures. The 
resulting performance is similar to the performance results 
shown for the case with no artificial failures. We omit these 
graphs for the lack of space. 
E. Protocol Overhead 
I )  Computation overhead: Figure 3(a) and3(b) show the 
computation overhead due to symmetric encryptions and 
asymmetric encryptions at the source node and a randomly 
selected member node for different protocols for experiments 
with the data rate of 5 packetslsecond (10kbps) and the group 
dynamics of 5 joins and 5 leaves per minute. For the symmetric 
encryption overhead, we observe that WSOM-LK has much 
higher overhead than the other protocols, especially at the 
source node. This is because WSOM-LK requires per data 
packet computation overhead that is linear to the number of 
children of the node. For the asymmetric encryption overhead, 
we observe that W-LKH has a significantly higher number of 
asymmetric encryptions performed at the source node than the 
other protocols. The reason is that with W-LKH the source 
node handles all the join and leave requests, each of which 
requires asymmetric encryption operations, whereas for the 
WSOM based protocols, the join and leave requests are han- 
dled in a distributed fashion, hence the required asymmetric 
encryptions are shared by all member nodes. Since asymmetric 
encryptions are computationally intensive operations, the high 
number of asymmetric encryptions at the source node in W- 
LKH can potentially introduce a performance bottleneck at the 
source, especially at high group dynamics. It also allows for 
potential DoS attacks that aim at exhausting the computation 
resource at the source node. 
2) The bandwidth overhead and latency for join and leave 
operations: Figure 3(c), 3(d) and Figure 3(e), 3(f) show the 
bandwidth overhead and latency for the join and leave events, 
respectively, for different levels of group dynamics. From 
these graphs, we can make the following observations. First, 
for all proposed protocols both the bandwidth overhead and 
h
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latency remain stable for different levels of group dynamics. 
Second, the WSOM based schemes have much less bandwidth 
overhead and latency than the W-LKH protocol for both join 
and leave events. This is the manifestation of the difference be- 
tween the centralized and decentralized membership manage- 
ment principles. With decentralized membership management, 
as in the case of WSOM, only local messages are required for 
joins and leaves. On the other hand, centralized membership 
management schemes, as W-LKH, require global messages 
between the joining or leaving node to the data source. 
3) Peak bandwidth: Figure 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d) show 
the bandwidth consumed at the source node over time for all 
the different protocols for a simulation run with the data rate 
of 5 packetslsecond (IOkbps) and the group dynamics of 5 
join and leave events per minute. From these graphs, we can 
see that WSOM based protocols consume relatively stable 
bandwidth at the source over time, while W-LKH exhibits 
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Fig. 4. The peak and total bandwidth overhead comparison 
the high peak bandwidth requirement of W-LKH is two-folds. 
First, the size of the rekey packets in W-LKH is relatively 
large, since potentially many keys on the key tree needs to 
be updated for a rekey event. Second, all the join and leave 
requests require communication with the source in W-LKH. 
Since high bandwidth peaks can cause packet loss and possible 
congestions on the network, W-LKH is less favorable than the 
WSOM based protocols in this respect. 
4) Total bandwidth overhead: In order to get an overview 
of all the bandwidth overhead introduced by the secure mul- 
ticast protocol, Figure 4(e) and 4(f) show the average total 
bandwidth overhead due to the secure multicast protocol for 
an entire simulation session for different data rates and group 
dynamics, respectively. 
We first observe that the bandwidth overhead for both 
WSOM-LK and WSOM-HK increase linearly with the data 
rate. However, the increase rate for WSOM-HK is significantly 
smaller than WSOM-LK, which makes the bandwidth over- 
head of WSOM-HK comparable to other protocols while the 
bandwidth overhead of WSOM-LK are significantly higher. 
This difference shows the effectiveness of the hop key in 
WSOM-HK for reducing the bandwidth overhead. From Fig- 
ure 4(f), we can also observe that for all the protocols, the total 
bandwidth overhead remains quite stable for different levels 
of group dynamics. 
F: Applicability of the Protocols 
with higher data rate, if the application can tolerate partial 
loss for forward and backward data secrecy, then WSOM-GK 
is the best choice. Otherwise, neither W-LKH and WSOM-GK 
can be used; the best choice is still WSOM-HK. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we explored different design choices for 
solving the problem of secure multicast service for WMNs. 
We proposed several secure multicast protocols, and compared 
them both analytically and experimentally. We discussed the 
trade-offs among different design choices and suggested the 
best design choices for different application scenarios. Future 
work includes extending the proposed protocols to multi- 
source group communications, and experimenting with the 
protocols in a wireless mesh testbed. 
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